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Critical Notice: D. H. Mellor, 
The Facts of Causation* 
Phil Dowet 
Department of Philosophy, University of Tasmania 
D. H. MELLOR, The Facts of Causation. London: Routledge (1995), 
xii+ 251 pp. 
The Facts of Causation claims to be a "complete account of causation 
and its implications." Mellor's concern is with singular causation; that 
is, where causes and effects are singular (he takes general causation to 
be a generalization concerning singular causation (pp. 6-7)). Singular 
causes and effects come in two sorts. Firstly, there are facts. Facts are 
actual states of affairs, and states of affairs correlate with whatever can 
be expressed in a sentence (so facts correlate with whatever can be 
expressed in a true sentence) (8-9). For example, that Don falls and 
that Don dies are facts, if actual. In general terms, the causation of one 
fact, E, by another, C, fits under the designation 'E, because C'. 
The other kind of thing that a cause or effect can be is a particular. 
There are two kinds of particulars which can be causes and effects: 
things, including people, and events (10). For example, Don, Don's fall- 
ing, and Don's dying are particulars. The causation of one particular, e, 
by another, c, will fit under the designation 'c causes e'. It turns out that 
while both facts (Ch. 9) and particulars (Ch. 10) can be linked by cau- 
sation, nevertheless when causation does link particulars, it does so by 
linking facts in which those particulars figure, so that causation between 
particulars reduces to causation between facts (Ch. 11). Thus all singular 
causation is or reduces to causation between facts (Ch. 11.4). 
Deterministic causation Mellor takes to occur when causes are nec- 
essary (the non-existence of the cause ensures the non-existence of its 
effect) and sufficient (the existence of the cause ensures the existence 
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D. H. MELLOR, THE FACTS OF CAUSATION 
of its effect) for their effects (13). The sense of necessity here is 'without 
which not'-causes are necessary for their effects just if their effects do 
not exist without them (16). Mellor requires that deterministic causes 
be necessary for their effects "for convenience," it being possible to 
treat sufficient but unnecessary causes as indeterministic causes (13). 
Mellor takes the causal conditional 'if C then E' involved in deter- 
ministic causation to be a closest world conditional in the manner of 
David Lewis (1986), but with the consequent being of the form 'the 
chance of E is one' (20). Alternatives, shown for various reasons to be 
inadequate, include English counterfactuals or subjunctive condition- 
als (14-15), material conditionals (15), strict conditionals (16-18), and 
Lewis' version of closest-world conditionals where the consequent is 
simply 'E' (18-19). 
This brings us to the question of chance. "Chances," Mellor says, 
"measure a kind of contingent and quantitative kind of possibility" 
(21), which corresponds to the appropriate sense of not-possibly-not 
necessity, where C gives E no chance of not existing. We will come in 
due course to Mellor's detailed theory of chance, but at this stage, 
Mellor makes three claims about chance. 
First, chances are probabilities, so they must satisfy some applica- 
tion of the probability calculus (21). Second, in general facts that have 
chances have many chances, for example, by having them at different 
times (22). Third, every chance is a property of (strictly speaking 'a 
fact about') another fact or set of facts without which the chance would 
not exist. Mellor writes this as: 
chF(P) = p 
where p is the value of the chance that fact P obtains and F is the fact 
of which the chance is a property (22). This means that P's chances are 
logically independent of P; in fact, they can exist when P does not. 
Applying this to causation, it follows that the chance of an effect, 
chc(E), is a property of another fact C, or a conjunction of other facts 
C&S, where S is the relevant circumstances in which C obtains. This 
conjunction is roughly localized in space and time. The chance a cause 
bestows on its effect in general will depend on the circumstances, unless 
one takes the cause to be the total cause of E, namely, the complex 
fact whose property ch(E) is not contingent on circumstances in which 
E is caused (24-25). 
Mellor makes two claims about such chances of effects. The first 
claim is that for every cause C and effect E there exists such a chance, 
chc(E). The second claim is that every effect E has a chance (perhaps 
zero) of existing in the circumstances S without C; ie ch_c(E) exists 
(25). Just what this latter chance is a property of is a problem since C 
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does not exist while the chance does. Mellor argues that it is a property 
of the circumstances, in particular, of local instances of the laws of 
nature (26-27). 
The truthmaker of chc(E) Mellor takes to be E's chances in the 
closest world to ours where C is true, and the truthmaker of ch-c(E) 
is E's chances in the closest world to ours where -C is true (27). This 
ties in with the closest-world account of causal conditionals '>' men- 
tioned above, so that, with 'tp' for 'the p such that', 
chc(E) = (p)(C=ch(E) = p) l(a) 
ch_c(E) = (tp')(-Cch(E) = p') l(b) 
(28)-although this is qualified later (178). This entails that E's chance 
is chc(E) when C is true and ch_c(E) when -C is true. (For a detailed 
critique of this account, see Dowe 1997). 
This leads to a natural reading of deterministic causes: C is sufficient 
for E just if C=ch(E) = 1 and C is necessary for E just if -C=>ch(E) 
= 0. These are not causal conditionals in the usual sense of 'if C then 
E' and 'if -C then -E' because the consequent is ch(E) not E. How- 
ever, Mellor asserts, nothing fits the normal sense of causal condition- 
als, and these closest-world conditionals come closest. On the grounds 
that nothing fits the bill Mellor proceeds to put the term to use by 
denoting such closest-world conditionals by 'causal conditionals' (29). 
(For a critique of this notion of causal conditionals, see Dowe 1997). 
Next, Mellor turns to interpretations of probability. He argues that 
none of the standard interpretations is an adequate account of chance, 
but that on examination of these, certain conditions on an account of 
chance emerge. First, that the chance of P is one entails P, for at the 
very least this is what a sufficient cause must do, or it would not in any 
sense ensure or guarantee its effect. Mellor calls this the necessity con- 
dition (31-32). Second, although chance and credence are not the same 
thing, for amongst other reasons credences do not always meet the 
necessity condition (33-36), it still holds that if all the evidence I have 
about P is that ch(P) = p, then my degree of belief that P, Cr(P) should 
be p. Mellor calls this the evidence condition (44). Nor can chances be 
evidential or logical relations because chances are contingent on the 
circumstances S (37-38). Third, although chances cannot be frequen- 
cies since among other things frequencies are not local whereas chances 
are (39-43), still any collective of facts of a kind Q* with the property 
ch(P*) = p will have the limiting frequency Foo(P*) = p. Mellor calls 
this the frequency condition (44). It can be shown that the frequency 
condition entails the evidence condition (45-48). In fact, these three 
conditions are necessarily true, ie holding of chance in all possible 
worlds (49). 
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Chance is the property of a fact such that these three conditions are 
met. There is nothing more to chance than that. In this sense chance 
is analogous to mass, which is defined purely in terms of the laws it 
figures in. 
Chance is of course related to propensity. The strength of the pro- 
pensity of a cause to bring about its effect is p if 'C=ch(E) = p'. 
Chances embody the propensity of actual finite reference classes to 
yield actual frequencies. The propensity of any chance to yield fre- 
quencies close to itself increases with the number of trials. Thus repe- 
tition of a chance setup causes the frequency to be close to the chance, 
so that the fact that frequencies are evidence for chances is an example 
of effects being evidence for their causes. 
We turn now to Mellor's argument against causal determinism. As 
is commonplace, Mellor begins with a case from quantum physics. 
However, his actual argument is far from commonplace. 
Suppose we have a radioactive atom of type E. Its laws give it a 
chance of decaying (Dx) in a given time interval 
ch (Dx) = X 
Suppose that atom h does decay in the time interval (Dh). Then its 
law gives it a chance X where 0<X< 1. But the determinist could deny 
that Dh has any causes. However, suppose instead we bombard h (write 
this as 'Bh') with some subatomic particle which raises its chance of 
decaying, say, from the very small value 10-10 to the very large value 
1-10-10, and that h does decay. Surely the bombarding caused the 
decay; i.e., 'Dh because Bh' is true. Then we have a cause which is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for its effect (53). 
Besides denying the bombarding caused the decay the only avenue 
open to the causal determinist is to appeal to hidden variables. If h and 
i are E atoms and in identical circumstances h decayed and i did not 
then that must be because there is some property C which h has and i 
does not, such that chch(Dh) = 1 and ch_ci(Di) = 0. 
According to Mellor chch(Dh) = 1 is consistent with the fact that 
ch(Dh) = X 7 1. But how can Dh have two chances at the same time? 
By those chances being the properties of different facts at that time 
(54). This I think presents Mellor with a serious difficulty. Since the 
chance that C gives E is dependent on the circumstances (24), C is part 
of the circumstances, so that ch(Dh) is not equal to k but is 1. To this 
Mellor replies (in conversation) that it is not, the circumstances need 
include only enough to underpin a law. To me this seems to have a 
number of undesirable consequences. First, it makes chance epistemic, 
since its value depends on how much of the circumstances are ac- 
counted for. Second, it makes it possible to have two true incompatible 
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laws each depending on different parts of the circumstances, so that in 
this case according to one law ch(Dh) = X and according to another 
ch(Dh) = 1. Therefore it seems to me unwise to allow relevant circum- 
stances to be omitted from a statement of circumstances. 
Nevertheless, to demonstrate that these chances are compatible Mel- 
lor tries to show that they both can meet the necessity, evidence and 
frequency conditions on chance. For example, the evidence condition 
is met if cr(Dh, ch(Dh) = p)= p. Evidence ch(Dh) = 1 justifies cr(Dh) 
= 1, and no other evidence can change that, and this must include the 
evidence that ch(Dh) = k. This should be my credence if my evidence 
includes both chances. But if my evidence includes only ch(Dh) = X, 
that justifies cr(Dh) = k. The first part of this seems wrong to me. If 
my evidence includes both chances then I have two credences 1 and X, 
from which it follows that credence is not an adequate interpretation 
of the probability calculus. 
However, Mellor argues that the existence of such hidden variables 
is irrelevant to the question of causal determinism. The reason is that 
even if a deterministic hidden variable is postulated, that hidden factor 
C will itself have an indeterministic cause: i.e., that h has C is a matter 
of chance, with no deterministic cause. If we postulate hidden variables 
for that, then those factors will have indeterministic causes, etc. There- 
fore hidden variables are irrelevant to the issue of causal determinism. 
Even so, the causal determinist can still insist that since causation is 
necessarily deterministic, none of these cases are causation. How then 
is this issue to be decided? Mellor's answer reveals broad features of 
his approach to metaphysics. 
The reason these disagreements about determinism arise is that it 
may appear sometimes that our commonsense notion does entail de- 
terminism. Yet other times we recognize indeterministic causes as 
causes. But it matters not that the commonsense notion is inconsistent. 
Often commonsense requires some degree of revision. The way to de- 
cide the issue here is to compare other connotations of causation: if 
those connotations require determinism then let causation necessarily 
be deterministic. If they allow indeterminism, let causation be possibly 
indeterministic. 
Mellor identifies five key connotations of causation: 
1. Causes precede their effects 
2. Causes and their effects are contiguous 
3. Causes are evidence for their effects 
4. Causes explain their effects. (60) 
5. Causes are means to bringing about their effects as ends. (66) 
It is clear, he says, that none of these entail determinism. But it is 
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also necessary to show why. This can be done non-controversially in 
the case of 3 and 4. For A to be evidence for B it is not required that 
B obtains. So where a cause is evidence for its effect it is not necessary 
that the cause is sufficient for its effect. So too for the case of expla- 
nation. The only account of explanation that might seem to say oth- 
erwise is Hempel's DN model (Hempel 1965), which says that an ex- 
planation entails what it explains. But causes rarely entail their effects: 
if the relevant law is contingent then not even the total cause entails its 
effect. So causes are not explanations on the DN model. What is an 
explanation is the total cause together with the law. Thus the (deriva- 
tive) sense in which a cause can explain its effect is by entailing that 
there is a law making the cause sufficient for the effect. 
This brings us to a key point in the book. Causation's connotations 
constrain the chances that causes give their effects. They require, argues 
Mellor, that every cause raise the chance of its effect: chc(E) > ch_c(E). 
Take the evidential connotation. To show that this entails that causes 
raise the chance of their effects Mellor uses an example of a cylinder 
firing, where the presence of gas G and the presence of oxygen O are 
causes of the explosion E, in addition to the firing of the spark C. Then 
chc(E) = chG(E) = cho(E) = ch(E) since each of these chances are 
evaluated in the closest world which in each case happens to be the 
actual world, where C, O and G obtain. So chc(E) does not measure 
C's contribution, but C's, 0's and G's joint contribution. The spark's 
contribution is measured by the difference between chc(E) and ch-c(E); 
where chc(E) is greater C is evidence for E, where it is less C is evidence 
against E, where they are equal it is not evidence either way. Thus the 
evidential connotation entails that causes raise the chance of their ef- 
fects. I worry that this begs the question. To say that causes are always 
evidence for their effects requires the assumption that causes always 
raise the chance of their effects. For in a genuine case of chance low- 
ering causation the the cause in question would not be evidence of its 
effect. For example, if Sue's pulling her shot causes a hole in one, yet 
lowers the chance of that effect, then Sue's pulling the shot is not evi- 
dence for her getting a hole in one. 
Mellor's case concerning explanation requires a particular account 
of the nature of explanation. According to Mellor the aim of expla- 
nation is to "reduce the gap" between what we know to be true (the 
explanandum in the absence of any explanation) and what we know 
to be necessary in the not-possibly-not sense. Full explanations will 
appeal to an explanans which makes the explanandum necessary in 
this sense. Partial explanations appeal to an explanans which reduces 
the range of possibility, i.e., raise the chance, of the explanandum. The 
less possible effect it is, the closer fact E becomes to being necessary. 
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Explanations raise chance rather than make probable for reasons par- 
allel to those just discussed concerning evidence. 
This account is supported by an argument to the best explanation, 
explaining why maths and logic don't often use explanation, whereas 
history and science do. Logic and maths give results which are already 
necessary, whereas science and history don't. 
The means-end connotation is an essential connotation in Mellor's 
view: "causation is essentially the feature of the world that gives ends 
means" (79-80), a view once proposed by Gasking (1955), and defended 
recently by Price (1996). But for this to be much help we need to know 
what the means-ends relation amounts to, and it had better not be in 
terms of causation. Mellor invokes non-causal decision theory, which in 
turn yields the result that means raise the chances of their ends, thus 
constraining causes to raise the chances of their effects (Ch. 7). 
It may be objected that there is another connotation which Mellor 
has omitted: that causes determine their effects (causal determinism). 
Mellor admits that this has been a widely accepted part of the concept. 
This makes the common concept inconsistent, and this requires revision. 
(The task of metaphysics by Mellor's lights is not simply to map the con- 
cept as it appears in common usage.) Something has to go, and deter- 
minism it is. However, Mellor feels that he is able to explain the appeal 
of causal determinism. This he does through the notion of the degrees 
of effectiveness of causes: since deterministic causes are the most effec- 
tive, we naturally think of deterministic causation as the paradigm. 
My main concern about this case is in the other direction: there are 
well-documented cases of chance-lowering causes. (Dowe 1993, Rosen 
1978, Salmon 1984). Mellor defends the probabilistic theory against 
this type of counterexample by drawing a distinction between partic- 
ular and factual causes (67-68). The particular event Don's fall is not 
the same thing as the fact that Don fell, although both may be causes. 
Mellor considers a standard chance-lowering example. Sue pulls her 
golf drive, but the ball hits a tree and bounces into the hole. "But the 
pulled drive causes her to hole out in one, even though she would have 
had a greater chance of doing so had she not pulled her drive." 
But, says Mellor, we must distinguish the particular event Sue's 
drive, from the fact that she drives the ball. That she drives the ball 
(D) does raise the chance that she gets a hole in one (H), and is a cause. 
This fact entails that the particular event Sue's drive causes the partic- 
ular event Sue's holing out. But it does not entail that the fact that Sue 
pulls her drive (P) causes the fact that Sue holes out. According to 
Mellor Sue holes out despite the fact that she pulled her drive. 
But to say D causes H but P does not seems unsatisfactory. P ex- 
presses the way D in fact obtained, and P in fact led to H (incredibly). 
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That the drive was pulled did produce the hole in one (not just that 
she drove the ball). 
Now proponents of the despite defense (Humphreys 1981, Papineau 
and Sober 1986, Papineau 1989) can dig in their heels and say that 
because P lowers the chance of H, H occurs despite P, (in the sense 
that it is a negative cause.) 
Mellor himself says it comes down to intuitions and that we reach 
a familiar stand-off. That may be so, but note two things. First, the 
intuition Mellor draws on is really just the intuition that chance low- 
erers aren't causes. But second, ad hominem, note that Mellor by his 
own lights should admit that his intuitions about this case are wrong. 
The reason is that on Mellor's account it can be shown that P does 
raise the chance of H, and so, on Mellor's account, P is a cause of H. 
P and D both give H the same chance, according to equation la, since 
the closest world where D and the closest world where P are both the 
actual world; thus chD(H) = chp(H) = ch(H). 
What is that chance? Consider P', the fact that Sue pulls her drive 
is exactly the right way to make it likely that the ball will strike the tree 
in exactly the right spot so as to make it likely that the ball will rebound 
into the hole. This is exactly what obtains in our case-Sue does pull 
her drive in that manner. Then, by the same reasoning as above, chD(H) 
= chp(H) = chp,(H) = ch(H). We can now see that the chance that D 
(or P or P') gives H in the circumstances is quite large (1, in a deter- 
ministic world). So the chance D gives H depends on the fine details 
about the fact D, stated or otherwise. So also the chance P gives H 
depends on the fine details about the fact P. 
So given there are finer details about the actual fact P, expressing 
the way she pulled the shot, it follows that chp(H) is much larger that 
Mellor supposes when he asserts that chp(H) < ch~p(H). Providing there 
is sufficient fine detail of this sort, as there surely is, then chp(H) > ch~p(H) 
and P is the cause of H by Mellor's own account. So by his own lights, 
Mellor's intuitions about this case are not to be trusted. 
But suppose there were no finer details about P, such as is the case with 
certain cases in quantum physics (see Dowe 1993, 1996; Salmon 1984). 
Then the fact D would raise H's chance, while P does not. But P would 
still be the way H arises, and so would be just as much the cause of H as 
it is in the previous scenario. So we have a chance-lowering cause. The 
only way to avoid this conclusion is to define away the possibility. 
There is much in this book that this review cannot adequately cover, 
concerning the causal relation, properties, laws, and time. Briefly, what 
causal facta (the entities in our world whose existence make true state- 
ments true) there are depends on what properties there are, which in 
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turn depends on what laws there are. Concerning time, according to Mel- 
lor there are no causal loops and causally linked facts cannot coincide. 
Thus causation picks out a linear dimension of spacetime which, Mellor 
argues, must be time. Time is the dimension of causation, so causes must 
precede their effects (Ch. 17). 
There is an increasing number of books being published on causation, 
but Mellor's book demands the attention of anyone with a serious interest 
in causation in metaphysics or philosophy of science. While it does engage 
with many issues of interest to contemporary philosophers, it does not 
explicitly engage current literature, yet it does stand on its own merits. It 
is difficult, challenging and in places ingenious. I found it hard but re- 
warding. The Facts of Causation certainly reaches the high standards that 
we have come to expect from Hugh Mellor. 
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